Constitutions et luttes de pouvoir en Haiti (Tome I)

Although we have only read the first time of Claude Moise's Constitutions et luttes de pouvoir en Haiti, it is enough to understand to a greater extent the intermittent political crises that negatively impacted the country from 1804-1915. Viewing the endless battles and conflicts for political power between different branches, clans, and regional elites since the birth of Haitian independence until the US Occupation through the conflict over constitutions to legitimize various regimes illustrates more clearly the impasse the Haitian political system had reached by 1915. Since each constitution was instituted either to deny power to another branch of the elite and legitimize their own seizure of power, there was a constant danger of political intrigue, coups, and revolutions to unseat the incumbent president/Executive and restore governmental legitimacy. Of course, the source of real power in the country was the Executive, and his power came from the military who administered the provinces as commandants. Thus, regardless of any constitutional innovations to protect civil government and individual liberties, all were at risk of arbitrary and despotic presidents (or, in the case of Dessalines, Soulouque, and Christophe, emperors and kings) who had to rely on the military as the main source of authority (as well as preserving public security). 

However, as Moise's masterful study reveals, there were a number of occasions in which branches of the political elite sought to institute a truly liberal, democratic state with more power to civil authorities. The first, the 1843 Constitution, was never truly implemented as Riviere Herard was unseated and the country's elite fell back on Guerrier and Riche to neutralize the threat of the Piquets. Here, unfortunately, Moise's analysis does not extend deeper into exploring how the Piquets themselves wanted to reconstitute the state, but he is certainly correct that most of the Haitian political elite banded together to prevent any real seizure of power from the lower classes. This included military repression, government appointments to Piquet leaders and the return to "presidentialism" to protect public security. After ending the Piquet threat, the political elites, both of the "mulatto" and "noir" branches, proceeded to implement other constitutions, such as that of 1846 and 1867. The Executive branch was severely weakened in the 1870s through the rise of the Liberals and Boyer-Bazelais, who favored a government dominated by the Legislative branch. Nonetheless, their favored constitution and governmental system, designed to weaken the Executive, was impractical as there was no real constitutional solution to conflict between the Executive and Legislative bodies. 

Furthermore, the Liberals, according to Moise, lacked deeper alliances with the real source of power in the country, the military leaders, and were thus severely weakened once the inevitable return of conflict over power returned in 1879 and beyond. Intriguingly, their regime did work well under Saget and Boisrond-Canal, although the exceptional circumstances and character of those men favored the longevity of this inherently unworkable system. By the end of the era of Liberal hegemony, despotic, arbitrary regimes dominated by Presidents like Salomon (who in one letter, compared the demands of political power to African conditions), Hyppolite, and Nord Alexis became the norm. Even with the 1889 Constitution that survived until the US Occupation, each president relied on unconstitutional measures, arbitrary despotism, the military, and sometimes, outright terror, to remain in power or endeavor to control succession. 

Throughout the entire period, the conflict over power and various attempts to legitimize new regimes with legality through new constitutions was usually able to counteract any serious attempts at opening the political system or debate to the lower classes. A few exceptions occurred, however. And it is these exceptions that warrant additional attention, particularly the Piquets (who still await their historian, to paraphrase Moise), cacos, and the urban masses who supported Salnave. La foule was especially relevant during the terror of Soulouque and presumably supported, initially, Soulouque's rise to effective power and self-elevation to Emperor. In addition, the urban masses, such as the women, who rallied behind Salnave, must be analyzed for revealing the political ideology of the lower classes. The cacos in the Nord similarly warrant closer attention, although Moise seems predisposed to discount the idea of any real political debate or ideology motivating their actions in the decades leading to US Occupation. That said, it seems hard to image the cacos of the Nord completely lacking ideas about reform, even if they were doomed to fail. The challenge now is to reconstruct, to whatever extent possible, how the peasants, urban poor, and embryonic working-class envisioned a different political regime in Haiti.